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Think Tanks: 
The Quest to Define and to Rank Them
Patrick Koellner
On 22 January 2014 the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the University 
of Pennsylvania releases its latest “Global Go To Think Tanks Report.” This series of 
annual reports, launched in 2007, has been subject to substantial criticism from scholars 
working in or on think tanks.
Analysis
Over the past decade, various organizations and publications have started to rank 
think tanks, mostly at the national level. Top-ranked think tanks like to announce their 
standings in promotional material and on their websites. While such ranking indexes 
help to draw attention to the growing think tank scenes across the globe and are thus 
to be welcomed, the existing rankings are fraught with problems; conceptual and 
methodological difficulties in particular are abound. Current attempts to rank think 
tanks therefore need to be approached with caution.
  There is no agreement on what essentially defines a think tank. Many definitions 
have been offered, but not one is entirely satisfactory. Given the prevailing ambiguity 
and also vagueness of think tank conceptualizations, we often do not really know 
which organizations should be considered thinks tanks and which ones should not.
  The national contexts in which think tanks operate differ and so do the ways in which 
they perform their various activities and roles in pursuing their manifold missions. 
Think tank rankings at the regional or global levels are thus always dubious.
  Output, public outreach or other performance-based criteria are usually offered to 
buttress think tank rankings, but these criteria are often not weighed or properly 
operationalized.
  It is especially difficult to assess think tanks’ policy-oriented influence. Various 
rankings try to measure some of the output produced by think tanks – output that 
can be understood as “intermediary products.” Counting such products can help to 
get a better idea of think tanks’ visibility, but not of their actual impact on public 
policy.
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Defining Think Tanks: Trying to Nail Jelly to a 
Wall? 
The term “think tank” has many connotations, 
which has resulted in conceptual ambiguity. Taka-
hiro Suzuki (2006), the Japanese think tank veter-
an and scholar, parsimoniously defines a “think 
tank” as an “organization that conducts public 
policy research.” Diane Stone (2001), a prominent 
expert on think tanks, defines them as “relative-
ly autonomous organizations engaged in the re-
search and analysis of contemporary issues inde-
pendently of government, political parties, and 
pressure groups.” In a major political science en-
cyclopedia, Stella Ladi (2011) describes think 
tanks as “organizations that are distinct from gov-
ernments and whose objective is to provide ad-
vice on a diverse range of policy issues through 
the use of specialized knowledge and the activa-
tion of networks.” Andrew Rich (2004) defines 
“think tanks” from a US perspective as “inde-
pendent, non-interest-based, non-profit organiza-
tions that produce and principally rely on exper-
tise and ideas to obtain support and to influence 
the policymaking process.” Given that the afore-
mentioned are all scholars, we can assume that 
they are conscious of their particular definition-
al choices and the conceptual commitments they 
entail. The point is that a particular definition will 
broaden or narrow the scope for an organization 
to qualify as think tank. For example, a think tank 
affiliated with a political party might well qualify 
as a think tank under the definitions given by Su-
zuki and Ladi, but would not do so under the def-
initions given by Stone and Rich.
More broadly, we can note that there is an in-
verse relationship between the number of attrib-
utes deemed essential for defining the object of 
interest and the number of objects that are cov-
ered by the definition. For instance, the more at-
tributes mentioned in a given definition of “think 
tanks,” the fewer think tanks that will actually be 
covered by that definition. It should also be ac-
knowledged that some attributes used to define 
the object in question are not as self-evident as 
they may seem. With respect to think tanks, an at-
tribute such as “independent” can mean different 
things. It may refer to financial independence, in-
stitutional independence, or even intellectual in-
dependence. In the first case, we would need to 
investigate funding patterns to determine wheth-
er a given think tank qualifies as independent. In 
the second case, we might look at existing organi-
zational links (e.g., affiliations). In the third case, 
the ideas or ideologies underlying the policy ad-
vice offered by think tanks would come into play. 
Moreover, assessments of “independence” can al-
so differ depending on the national context. While 
a US-based observer might, for example, consid-
er a state-funded think tank as one that is not in-
dependent, an observer based in Western Europe 
might see state funding as something that is – or 
at least can be – absolutely in line with indepen-
dence. In sum, definitions of “think tanks” can 
suffer not only from problems of conceptual am-
biguity but also of conceptual vagueness.
Thus, the challenge is to offer definitions that 
are as concise as possible but still manage to cap-
ture the essential attributes of think tanks. Such 
definitions should also be precise enough to reli-
ably demarcate those organizations covered by the 
definition from those that are not. For the purpose 
of a cross-country analysis of think tanks, I would 
define “think tanks” as organizations whose main 
mission is to inform or influence public policies 
(and in some cases also corporate affairs) on the 
basis of research and analysis provided by in-
house and affiliated staff. Such a definition implic-
itly acknowledges that think tanks come in var-
ious stripes and colors. Reflecting the particular 
contexts they are operating in (“exogenous fac-
tors”) and the specifics of the particular organiza-
tions (“endogenous factors”), think tanks: 
• differ in size; 
• operate on a stand-alone basis or are linked to 
government ministries, foundations, universi-
ties, political parties, etc.;
• employ, in varying proportions, staff with dif-
ferent kinds of primary expertise (research-
ers, PR specialists, former government officials, 
etc.);
• specialize on given topics or use a broader but 
still delimited focus;
• receive different types of financing, including 
public funding, private-sector donations, mem-
bership fees, and contract funding for specific 
projects; 
• aim to inform or influence public policy by en-
gaging in different types of activities (e.g., such 
as publishing policy papers and briefs; organiz-
ing and participating in policy-relevant forums 
and networks; providing assessments, testimo-
nials and recommendations in various kinds 
of meetings with parliamentary and executive 
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policy makers; appearing in the media; and 
supplying personnel through short-term sec-
ondments or on a more long-term basis, for ex-
ample, after changes in government).    
Supply and demand factors influence the institu-
tional development, the organizational character-
istics, and the modi operandi of think tanks in na-
tional settings. Such factors include political re-
gime type, the institutional particularities of polit-
ical systems, political traditions, regulative condi-
tions, the availability of (different kinds of) fund-
ing, labor market specifics and established career 
options, civil society dynamics, and so on (see 
Stone 2004, 2005). Notably, however, such fac-
tors do not work in the same universal way, as 
variation exists across the globe and even with-
in world regions. To understand why and how 
think tanks operate the way they do, we can ei-
ther map the landscapes of national or issue-spe-
cific think tanks or zoom in on individual think 
tanks.1 The resulting topologies and case studies 
can benefit from Tom Medvetz’s advice to concep-
tualize think tanks as hybrid organizations oper-
ating in between the fields of academic knowledge 
production, politics, business, and media. While 
think tanks need to be close to and tap into these 
fields (which supply them with authority, fund-
ing, and access to opinion and decision makers), 
they also need to keep a certain distance in order 
to maintain their specific identity as think tanks. 
Operating as a think tank thus requires a care-
ful balancing act (Medvetz 2008, 2012), which will 
play out differently across space and time.
The discussion so far should have made clear 
how difficult it is to adequately define and, in 
broader terms, conceptualize think tanks – even if 
the related discussions and analyses are confined 
to a particular national setting. Things become 
even more complicated if the aim is to conduct 
cross-country examinations. This is, however, 
exactly what one of the most well-known global 
ranking indexes of think tanks sets out to achieve. 
In the following section, some of the conceptu-
al and methodological problems associated with 
the Global Go To Think Tanks (GGTTT) rankings 
– conducted and published annually since 2007 by 
1 Recent examples include the insightful studies by Boucher 
(2004) and, Missiroli and Ioannides (2012) on European think 
tanks with a focus on EU policy issues, by Thunert (2008) 
on the German think tank scene, and the in-depth study by 
Wiarda (2010) of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in the 
US.
the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the 
University of Pennsylvania – will be discussed.
Ranking Think Tanks across the Globe: How it 
is Done and Why it Fails to Deliver
Rankings are essentially an instrument for or-
dering outcomes or at least assessments there-
of. While rankings are usually fairly brief, they 
can be the subject of endless discussion. They can 
be based on more or less “hard” indicators or on 
more subjective assessments. In the social scienc-
es as well as in public discourse, we tend to fo-
cus more on rankings that are based on hard indi-
cators.2 The GGTTT index represents an effort to 
“generate a ranking of the world’s leading think 
tanks” (McGann 2013, 4). This index has certain-
ly helped to put the spotlight on organizations 
that are in the business of providing research-
based policy advice. James McGann and his asso-
ciates put the current number of think tanks op-
erating in 182 countries across the globe at 6,603. 
While this count is probably too high,3 most schol-
ars would agree that the countries with the most 
think tanks are (perhaps even in this order) the 
United States, China, the United Kingdom, India, 
and Germany (ibid., 34). As most of the existing 
literature on think tanks deals with organizations 
situated in the United States, any efforts to over-
come this spatial bias are certain to be welcomed. 
It is important, however, not to take the results 
of this particular ranking exercise at face value. 
The organizers of the GGTTT index are upfront 
about some of the biases of their rankings, in-
2 Which is not to say that subjectively based rankings are with-
out interest – just think of national rankings of most popular/
unpopular politicians.
3 While a lengthy (and since 2007 certainly improved) defini-
tion of “think tanks” is provided in the GGTTT reports, the 
number of think tanks counted overall and at the country lev-
el beckons the question of how far the GGTTT organizers take 
their own definition into consideration when they try to iden-
tify think tanks across the globe. Entries in the 2012 rankings 
include, for example, Amnesty International, Transparency 
International, and Human Rights Watch (three global advo-
cacy groups), the World Economic Forum (an international 
organization with a corporate membership), the “Max Planck 
Institute” (the Max Planck Society is probably meant here, 
which is, however, just an umbrella organization for the 80 
plus German Max Planck Institutes – all of which are main-
ly devoted to conducting basic research), the National En-
dowment for Democracy, and the Open Society Institute (two 
foundations). Also, are we really to believe that in 2012 there 
were 137 “think tanks” in Argentinia, 86 in South Africa, 54 in 
Romania, 53 in Kenya, 51 in Bolivia and 28 in the Dominican 
Republic?
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cluding the possible underrepresentation of think 
tanks in world regions such as Africa and Asia. In 
the most recent ranking processes, they have tried 
to address this problem by “democratizing” the 
nomination process – that is, by allowing “peers” 
from all 6,603 “think tanks” as well as some 3,500 
journalists, “public and private donors,” and se-
lected policy makers to nominate up to 25 orga-
nizations in one or more of the existing 38 rank-
ing categories (self-nominations are not allowed). 
In round two, the same people can rank the orga-
nizations that receive five or more nominations in 
round one. It is up to the participants how many 
think tanks they want to rank in any of the exist-
ing categories (self-ranking is not allowed). The re-
sulting lists are then vetted by an unknown num-
ber of “functional and regional experts” to check 
for “any errors, translations typos or serious omis-
sions.” In round three, the same group of experts 
has a chance to review the final rankings and to 
suggest “any warranted” changes to the organiz-
ers, who then prepare the final rankings for publi-
cation. The result of this process is that early every 
year, we come to learn which are the “top think 
tanks” in the world, by world region, “area of re-
search,” or some other criteria. Or do we really?
These rankings, however, unfortunately suffer 
from some serious problems. When ranking think 
tanks, it is necessary to undertake this task on the 
basis of clear-cut criteria. If a think thank is ranked 
top (or higher or lower than another organiza-
tion) in category A or B, for example, we should 
know why. Participants in the GGTTT index rank-
ing process are presented with a lengthy (but, ac-
cording to the organizers, not exclusive) list of 18 
broad criteria, which includes “access to elites in 
the area of policymaking, media and academia,” 
the “number of recommendations to policymak-
ers,” “staff serving advisory roles to policymak-
ers,” “awards given to scholars,” and “success in 
challenging the traditional wisdom of policymak-
ers and in generating innovative policy ideas and 
programs.” While many of the criteria listed are 
arguably useful for assessing the performance of 
think tanks, participants receive little guidance 
on how to operationalize or weigh these criteria. 
Rather, they are asked to reflect on the differenc-
es between numerous “resource indicators,” “uti-
lization indicators,” “output indicators,” and “im-
pact indicators,” which are supposed to be linked 
to some of the criteria previously mentioned.
The question here is how realistic is it that 
ranking participants – be they ordinary nominees 
or “panel experts” – will or are able to make use of 
the multitude of criteria and indicators? The par-
ticipants are presumably busy people who cannot 
be expected to employ large teams of methods-
savvy research assistants to prepare their assess-
ments. In all likelihood, the vast majority of par-
ticipants will in some way take shortcuts in con-
ducting their evaluations, perhaps by basing them 
on personal contacts with think tanks or by focus-
ing on well-known, long-standing think tanks. 
Clearly, such assessments would be subjective, 
and visibility is not the same thing as success in 
terms of helping to turn ideas into policy. So while 
the rankings give the impression of being based 
on some rigorous application of carefully chosen 
criteria and indicators, in reality they are not. It is 
basically about perception, not analysis (Mendiz-
abal 2011). Of course, as the methodological foun-
dations of the ranking process are flawed, so are 
its results.
In sum – as also pointed out by Enrique Men-
dizabal (2011), Goran Buldioski (2011), and oth-
ers – the GGTTT rankings suffer from a number of 
serious problems, most of which cannot be reme-
died. Furthermore, what value is there in global-
ly – or regionally for that matter4 – ranking think 
tanks (i.e., organizations operating differently in 
vastly divergent national and other contexts)? 
While top-ranked think tanks are happy to make 
use of their strong standings (not least when seek-
ing funding), rankings such as these could con-
tribute to a situation wherein think tanks start 
to invest more in public relations activities than 
in their core policy research (Mendizabal 2011). 
Might we, however, arrive at more useful rank-
ings if we just focused on one particularly impor-
tant aspect of think tanks – namely, their policy in-
fluence on specific national or other contexts? I ad-
dress this question in the following section.
Assessing the Influence of Think Tanks: 
Output-Based Metrics and Their Limits
The question of whether think tanks are influ-
ential – and, if so, how much – has often been 
4 As Mendizabal (2012) notes, “[c]omparing across an entire 
continent offers no valuable insights unless a common 
playing field of characteristics is used.”
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raised.5 Answers, if ventured at all, differ. Re-
sponses depend to a significant degree on the the-
oretical dispositions and inclinations of those pos-
ing the question. Adherents of “power elite the-
ory” might be inclined to argue that think tanks 
can and do exert influence because they are part 
of the ruling elite. Neo-Marxists might believe 
in a Gramscian vein that think tanks matter be-
cause they contribute to forming and upholding 
hegemonic discourses. Pluralists might consider 
think tanks to be important suppliers in the “mar-
ket place” for policy ideas. Of course, think tanks 
themselves can also be prone to overstating their 
influence in the policy process (“credit claiming”), 
which is motivated by a need to convince funders 
of their value (Stone 2004). As Murray Weiden-
baum (2010) notes, “there is an inevitable amount 
of puffery in the claims of individual think tanks.” 
Most observers would, however, subscribe to Wei-
denbaum’s assessment that the influence of think 
tanks “varies by organization, issue, and time pe-
riod.” Yet, this raises the question of what exactly 
constitutes “influence.” One answer has been pro-
vided by Andrew Rich (2004, 153),6 who defines 
influence in this context as “success by experts in 
making their work known among a set of policy 
makers so that it informs their thinking on or pub-
lic articulation of policy relevant information.” 
“Periods of critical transition” (Stone 2004) in par-
ticular, such as postelection changes of govern-
ment or periods in which hitherto prevailing para-
digms are challenged by real-world events and/or 
by new(ly dominant) government actors, can pro-
vide windows of opportunity for think tanks seek-
ing to influence policy processes.
Tracking down the actual influence of think 
tanks in policy processes – be it during the agen-
da-setting stage or policy deliberations – is com-
plicated in practice. It is a rare occurrence that 
high-ranking policy makers officially acknowl-
edge the input of think tanks in such processes. 
While discourse analysis can help to better under-
stand policy-making processes, it usually cannot 
account for the dynamics involved. Determining 
the possible influence of think tanks in policy pro-
cesses thus also requires case-specific process trac-
ing. Such process tracing, however, faces difficul-
5 See Abelson (2009) and Weidenbaum (2010).
6 We should of course not ignore the possibility of think tanks 
providing only ex post “intellectual legitimation” for policy 
courses already charted and policy decisions already taken by 
the executive (Stone 2004).
ties due to methodological and other reasons. For 
example, it can take years (even decades) before 
an initial idea is eventually translated – if at all – 
into a concrete piece of legislation or government 
action. Moreover, the success of such translation 
processes usually has many guardians – or at least 
actors claiming guardianship – while failure (i.e., 
no action taken) is usually a stray and is certainly 
not discussed much (see also Weidenbaum 2010). 
This is linked to the general problem of attribu-
tion: “Policy input comes from many places. Pub-
lic or governmental policy development is a com-
plex and iterative process in which policy ideas 
are researched, analysed, discussed and refined 
– often through broad consultations with many 
stakeholders. When a policy is finally adopted, it 
may wear the fingerprints of many hands” (Kuntz 
2013). Process tracing is in any case a time-con-
suming activity. It requires the available evidence 
being painstakingly pieced together in order to ar-
rive at plausible explanations for some outcome. 
However, while the scholar(s) concerned might 
try to refute alternative explanations of the out-
come, such accounts can never fully be ruled out.
It is perhaps not surprising then that efforts 
to capture and assess the influence of think tanks 
usually rely more on quantitative indicators and 
more easily available data. For example, “input” 
into policy processes can be measured by count-
ing the number of policy papers and briefs issued 
by individual think tanks, as well as oral presenta-
tions and testimonials provided by think tank staff 
to members of the legislature and the executive. 
It is also possible to count policy-oriented events 
organized and attended by think tanks and their 
staff, media interventions by the latter,7 instances 
of think tank staff getting seconded to government 
agencies, and so forth (Kuntz 2013). In a related 
vein, Julia Clark and David Roodman (2013) have 
recently sought to measure the public outreach ac-
tivities of US think tanks and international devel-
opment think tanks using the following five in-
dicators: (1) number of “social media fans” (i.e., 
Facebook likes and Twitter followers), (2) relative 
global web traffic rank, (3) number of sites linking 
to their websites, (4) number of mentions in glob-
al news sources (in all languages), and (5) number 
7 For example, the non-profit organization Fairness & Ac-
curacy in Reporting (FAIR) provides rankings of US think 
tanks based on their citations in the media. See most recent-
ly <http://fair.org/extra-online-articles/fair%E2%80%88study-
think-tank-spectrum-2012/> (accessed 23 September 2013).
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of Google Scholar citations. To get a better idea of 
the efficiency of the think tanks in question, they 
also adjust their results for budget volumes. Clark 
and Roodman are very much aware of the meth-
odological problems and the general limitations 
of their ranking exercise, but they certainly dem-
onstrate that is possible to go beyond simple per-
ception-based rankings.8 While the quest for “per-
fect” think tank rankings is clearly elusive, stim-
ulating work like the aforementioned shows that 
there is scope for improvement. 
At the end of the day, however, quantitative 
metrics can only help to get a better idea of the 
output or visibility of think tanks and their staff. 
Quantitative metrics can be useful for capturing 
the “intermediate goods” (Weidenbaum 2010) of-
fered by think tanks. Such metrics have, howev-
er, little to say about the actual impact that think 
tanks, individually or collectively, might have on 
policy processes. Whether policy makers make 
use of these goods is a different question. Reputa-
tional data – based, for example, on surveys ask-
ing policy makers how much they value individ-
ual think tanks and their experts – can be used to 
try and capture impact. But again, such data are 
more about perceptions and tell us little about ac-
tual impact. Moreover, it is difficult to link such 
data with other quantitative data in a convincing 
manner.9 Given these analytical problems, rank-
ing think tanks in terms of influence remains a 
highly problematic undertaking, even at the na-
tional level.
8 Another, qualitative approach has been pursued since 2001 
by Prospect Magazine in the UK, which uses a panel composed 
of a handful of experts to judge its annual think tanks awards 
(online: <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/thinktanks/
the-awards/>, accessed 21 December 2013).
9 For an attempt to link reputational data with data on both ac-
ademic journal publications and media interventions, see the 
recent ranking of the national daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung (FAZ) of Germany’s “most influential” economists and 
the organizations they are affiliated with (FAZ, 26 September 
2013, 10, online: <www.faz.net/oekonomen>, accessed 21 Sep-
tember 2013). Methodologically more dubious are the rank-
ings of South Korean think tanks provided by the Hankyung 
Business newspaper, which are based on amalgamations of 
scores for “public influence,” “quality of research papers,” 
“competency of researchers,” and “scale of the institute” (on-
line: <http://magazine.hankyung.com/business/apps/news?p
opup=0&nid=01&c1=1001&nkey=2011122100837000421&mo
de=sub_view>, accessed 12 December 2013).
Handle with Caution
This paper is intended to alert readers to the nu-
merous problems and challenges besetting cur-
rent efforts to rank think tanks. It is not an argu-
ment to simply do away with such ranking index-
es, imperfect as they are. Rankings will remain at-
tractive for many reasons. They appeal to our curi-
osity in terms of wanting to know who is perform-
ing well and who is underperforming. They may 
even help in terms of establishing benchmarks of 
successful think tanks as well as improving gov-
ernmental and organizational policies. Rankings 
will always be around, but we need to be careful 
when reading and using them. Furthermore, with 
respect to existing think tank rankings, we need to 
be aware of their conceptual and methodological 
foundations in order to understand their respec-
tive limitations. In particular, we should not mis-
take perception-based rankings for those based 
on sound and rigorous research. However, if we 
approach think tank rankings with the necessary 
caution, we can enjoy them in a responsible man-
ner. 
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